

How Jihadi Salafists Sometimes Breach, But Mostly Circumvent, Facebook's Community Standards in Crisis, Identity and Solution Frames

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How jihadi Salafists sometimes breach, but mostly circumvent, Facebook's community standards in crisis, identity and solution frames

We analyzed posts written by Facebook profiles who advocate violent jihad without supporting any terrorist group. They share extremist content in the middle of regular posts, thanks to which they are likely to reach a large audience. We identified to what extent their ingroup-outgroup opposition is constructed in crisis, identity, and solution frames and how they use these frames in posts which sometimes breach Facebook's community standards, but which mostly circumvent them through various strategies of doublespeak. Among them, myth, in the sense of Barthes, and eudaimonic content appeared as particularly powerful to naturalize and spread jihadi ideology on social media.

Wordcount: 11965 words

Introduction

In November 2019, the European Union celebrated a small victory: over 26 000 items of self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS)-supporting content, as well as channels and groups, were referred from nine online service providers, thanks to an action coordinated by Europol's European Union Internet Referral Unit (IRU). Facebook has every reason to be pleased, too. They claimed a 99.6% proactive rate on terrorist organizations in Q1 2021, which means that less than 1% of this type of violating content is reported by Facebook users.¹ Back in 2017, they claimed that their technologies allowed them to remove 99% of IS and Al Qaeda-related terror content before it was flagged by users.² However, all these positive figures may paint a distorted picture of reality : Europol's scope only concerns official propaganda posted by designated terrorist organizations, so any unofficial radicalized content remains

under the radar.³ In the same vein, social media companies' takedown of IS activity probably leaves aside great volumes of more general violent jihadi content that is not explicitly branded as IS propaganda and, therefore, slips through the net of content moderation much more easily.⁴ Indeed, in addition to terrorist organizations, there are also private communicators, particularly on social media, who are supporters of violent jihad but who do not explicitly express their adhesion to any extremist organization. Such actors communicate radicalized content in the midst of regular, non-extremist posts, following a "wolf-in-sheep's-clothes-strategy".⁵ This kind of extremist Salafists' propaganda on social media can also play a key role in radicalization, because these extremist profiles 1) make it harder for social platforms to identify and delete radical actors from social platforms⁶ and 2) can be "dormant cells,"⁷ who attract vulnerable people with non-violent public content and subsequently recruit followers via private messaging.⁸

Supplementary to the body of research that addresses IS' official propaganda or IS supporters' activities on social media, we seek to identify how supporters of Global Jihadist Movements (GJM) who do not express their adhesion to any extremist organisation (at least explicitly) promote violent extremism on Facebook. We hold the hypothesis that by sharing content that moves away from IS' military propaganda, such GJM supporters engage in the fragmentation of violent Salafist propaganda and in a more diffuse online presence.⁹ In a context in which visual communication is key on social media, we quantitatively and qualitatively tested our hypothesis on 1720 multimodal posts written by extremist Salafists on Facebook between October 2016 and October 2019. With our study, we contribute to the existing body of literature by

expanding the scope of the communication channels and practices used in jihadi extremism.

Our paper is structured as follows: In Sections One and Two, we outline how IS' official propaganda and IS supporters' communication on social media are built on crisis, identity and solution frames, and we emphasize the potential common features and differences with the social media presence of GJM supporters who do not express their adherence to any extremist organisation. Variables of period, connection with local contexts, profile and technical affordances partly explain why the existing insights into IS' highly contextualized official propaganda and IS supporters' propaganda on social media need to be completed to capture these GJM supporters' more diffuse and implicit communication strategies. Among the various strategies of doublespeak, which allow the perpetrators to circumvent deletion of content, myth, in the sense of Barthes,¹⁰ and eudaimonic content appear as particularly powerful to naturalize and spread jihadi ideology on social media. These two concepts are examined in Section Three. In the Sections that follow, we present our mixed methodology and our results, before ending with the discussion and the conclusion.

Crisis, identity and solution frames in IS' official propaganda and in IS supporters' social media communication

In reaction against the failures of contemporary states and societies and in times of ubiquitous identity crises, Salafism and its simple, polarized and reassuring social order particularly appeal to vulnerable young people.¹¹ “As an alternative approach to the pursuit of justice and the good life, Salafism's capacity to empower and change identities can be seen as its most important social effect”.¹² Their grand narrative is

constructed around the decline of Islam and the oppression of the *ummah*, i.e. the Muslim community. They both justify violence in order to stimulate Muslim resurgence and establish states based on strict interpretations of the sacred texts.¹³ Ingram¹⁴ points out how identity, solution and crisis constructs interplay in self-proclaimed Islamic State' Salafist propaganda. The crisis construct consists of three core themes: 1) the incompatible differences between the in- and the outgroup, which is considered as a threat; 2) theological, socio-political and existential uncertainties, and 3) the breakdown of the in-group's tradition due to the outgroup's influence or threat. The solution construct positions itself as the opposite to the crisis construct with three themes: 1) commitment to the in-group identity; 2) certainty through simplicity, stability, understanding and predictability, and 3) reinforcement of traditions. The interplay between crisis and solution constructs is fuelled by polarized ingroup and outgroup identities. The various empirical analyses of IS' official propaganda emphasize their use of crisis, identity and solution frames: IS frames the caliphate as an "Islamic utopia"¹⁵ and jihad as adventure and camaraderie while also focusing on victimhood.¹⁶ They also contrast glory of martyrdom with the contradiction between pre-IS everyday life and true adherence to Islam.¹⁷

Crisis-identity-solution framing constructs are also exploited in IS' visual strategies: images of children are used to positively frame IS by portraying them flourishing under the caliphate, and to negatively frame the outgroup with pictures of children as victims of Western-backed warfare.^{18 19}

Hence, we have a rather good knowledge of IS' official communication, and especially how they exploit Salafist crisis, identity and solution frames. Research into IS supporters' propaganda is more limited,²⁰ but it also emphasizes how crisis, identity and solution constructs play a prominent role in unofficial communication, especially on

social media. Dillon et al. compared social media content shared on Twitter, Facebook, Ask.fm, Tumblr, and Instagram between 2011 and 2015 by both IS foreign fighters and IS supporters. They identified five key themes which fall within crisis (threat to in-group and societal grievances), identity (pursuit of significance, religion) and solution frames (religion, commitment). Regardless of the platform, they observed how threats to in-group, societal grievances, and pursuit for significance were dominant themes in foreign fighters' posts. By contrast, religion and commitment issues (i.e. engagement in violent jihad or migration to the Caliphate) were prevalent in supporters' posts.

Apart from these Salafist frames, which are also exploited in IS' official propaganda, IS supporters' practices on social media may have little in common with the social media activities performed by GJM supporters who do not express their adherence to any extremist organisation. Variables of period, connection with local contexts, profile and technical affordances may explain key differences. Firstly, other than some Twitter data (2016-2017) and some Telegram data (2018),^{21 22}, the covered time period of most studies on IS supporters' presence on social media does not go beyond 2015. That was the turning point when social media content regulations against extremist content increased significantly²³; both the social platforms' terror detection technologies and IS supporters' strategies to circumvent them were still underdeveloped. Secondly, until the fall of the physical caliphate, communication on social networks was closely related to the battlefield. Both official and IS supporters' social media posts were very much linked to IS' military actions. IS supporters anticipated or heavily reacted to military events on Twitter,²⁴ and IS recruiters targeting the West preyed on feelings of remote intimacy on the same social media, with direct regular outreach by foreign fighters based in Syria and Iraq.²⁵ Dillon et al. emphasize how the local context in Syria might particularly explain the prevalence of several crisis, identity and solution constructs. For

example, posts about the pursuit of significance (39.5%) peaked in 2014, when IS was establishing its Caliphate, while IS' defeats in March 2015 might explain the increase of posts about threats to the in-group (19.1%).²⁶ Through sharing new and resharing previously distributed material, IS supporters created a sense that the organization was always in motion, online and on the battlefield.²⁷ Even if they received various degrees of attention, IS' military events and actions were a unifying theme among IS supporters on Twitter.²⁸ Thirdly, due to IS supporters' explicit focus on IS and their military actions, which is violating content that is removed from the platforms, IS supporters' accounts were rather short-lived. In Alexander's sample of 2016-2017 tweets, most accounts lasted fewer than fifty days.²⁹ Fourthly, the technical affordances provided by every social platform led to specific types of communication purposes and activities. Twitter had been massively used by IS supporters until 2015, when other platforms like Telegram offered encryptions services. On Telegram, distribution of pro-IS material was the primary function (53%), followed by the sharing of official IS media and operational instructional material (both 15%).³⁰ Besides, the controlling role of the feeder accounts guarantees a relative homogeneity in the communication on social media and a coherent focus on the military actions.³¹ Furthermore, intra-platform sharing on Twitter seems prevalent: among the 28% of IS supporters' tweets that contained one or several URLs, 64% of them were linked to other Twitter content.³² Less than 1% of the URL-based tweets tied in with another social media platform. Practices on Twitter were therefore taking place in relative isolation, with a focus on military activities, although not exclusively. However, apart from these types of social media presence that are rather specific to supporters of a military organization, they also promote jihadi Salafism without overtly integrating extremist propaganda. The same study revealed that more than a quarter of

the URLs that are linked to content outside Twitter consist of links to mass media items.³³ Among them, news articles related to persecution (i.e. crisis construct) were common. In this way, the supporters can strengthen the Salafi-Jihadi crisis, identity and solution constructs and, therefore, harden the resolve of vulnerable targets through content that does not breach the community standards of the social platforms. They might share this more implicit strategy with GJM supporters who do not express their adherence to any extremist organisation. A major difference, however, lies in the fact that such shared media content is deleted by the platforms when posted by accounts that they consider belonging to terrorist organizations (since all their content is deleted), whereas these media-based posts are maintained when the profiles do not make explicit references to terrorist organizations like IS.³⁴

Crisis, identity and solution constructs in GJM supporters' communication on social media

Bindner and Gluck³⁵ identified two types of dormant cells, who either share various non-violent content through their public profiles but reach potential recruits or sympathizers via private messages, or who feed short-lived accounts that are created when specific elements of propaganda emerge. As is evident from the previous Section, the IS supporters studied in existing research rather fall within the second category. By contrast, by avoiding sharing violent and military content, GJM supporters who do not express their adherence to any extremist organisation might fall within the first category. They might follow the advice given in the al-Hayat Media Center video 'Inside the Khilafah n.8', released on October 30, 2018, to remain digitally active and resilient as well as to "strive patiently".³⁶ In addition, the individuals behind such profiles might

also truly not support any terrorist organization and only adhere to violent jihad on a more abstract level. In doing so, they are not militants under cover but part of the vast majority of people holding extremist beliefs who do not, at least for the time being, engage in extremist action or terrorism.³⁷ This pervasiveness makes unofficial propaganda particularly problematic. To our knowledge, only two studies have focused on jihadi-Salafist propaganda on social media that do not relate to any terrorist organization. Both draw attention to the importance of the crisis and victimization frames. In her qualitative analysis of extremist Salafists' Facebook profiles, Renault³⁸ shows how such propaganda is particularly based on victimization strategies: glorification of martyrdom, or victim status as a factor of community belonging, and defensive violence embodied by the figure of the vigilante. Furthermore, these posts often mix *logos* and *pathos*, by relying first on a discourse of objectification of the harm, which aims to present the grievance as an easily demonstrable factual reality. In a quantitative content analysis, Frischlich³⁹ coded Instagram posts written by an extremist Salafist influencer. Two of the frames she used fall within the crisis construct. The first one is "conservatism" (44.5%), which comprises worldviews that warn against Western lifestyle and the consequences of the breakdown of traditions; the second one is "violence incitement" (8.6%), which encompasses open anti-democratic statements and the glorification of violent jihad. The other posts fall within Salafist education (instructions for correct religious and social behaviour). While compared to other content, violence incitements are not very frequent but their occurrence on an open social media platform is rather worrisome.

Strategies of naturalization in myth and eudaimonic content

Extremists have long been aware of the possibilities offered by implicit or explicit polysemy, allowing for doublespeak and “ideological innocence”⁴⁰ in their pretending that they only convey neutral content. Research on right-wing extremism points out the overlaps between extreme and radical right-wing organisations, the latter successfully skirting the line in terms of their discourse, delivering highly exclusionary rhetoric within the limits of legal speech. Consequently, clear-cut boundaries between right-wing extremist and radical actors are becoming increasingly obsolete.⁴¹ A similar phenomenon can be observed in the Salafist context: identifying content advocating violent jihad by GJM supporters who do not express their adhesion to any extremist organisation is a more delicate operation than identifying content posted by organizations listed as terrorist ones or by their supporters whose affiliation is explicit. In this respect, identifying violent content posted by GJM supporters is akin to the challenges traditionally faced with right-wing extremist content.⁴² Like the extreme right, radical Salafism is not a centralized movement; it rather consists of an ecology of loosely-connected individuals with varying degrees of radicalization, who have learnt to circumvent the community standards of the social platforms with doublespeak strategies.

Two types of social media content are particularly powerful to share extremist ideas through doublespeak strategies: *myth*, in the sense of Barthes, and *eudaimonic content*. These two types of content are usually presented in image macros, in the shape of quotes or other short inspiring text coupled with visual background. The strategic use of visual content only increases their persuasive power. Visual content generates (much) higher engagement rates on all social media, which confirms and reinforces the prevalence of the visual at the same time. Implementing extremist propaganda in the

information-dense and high-choice social media environment potentially leads to a limited capacity for processing the portrayed messages by social media users, which makes attentional biases for visual content more prevalent.⁴³ In this respect, myth and eudaimonic content on social media particularly encapsulate the predominance of the visual and the power of the picture superiority effect. As we will explain below, myth is particularly powerful to promote extremist ideas insofar as it naturalizes ideologies, while eudaimonic content particularly inspires social media users and motivates them to spread these inspiring ideas.

The persuasive power of myth

Myth is a slippery concept. In the vernacular, myth is often synonym for fallacy. This might explain why Géré⁴⁴ approaches the Salafist myth as “an ideological narrative which pretends to build a brand-new future based on true and superior values.”

However, the relations between fact and fiction in myth are much more complex than a binary opposition. And this is precisely what makes it powerful.⁴⁵ In his poststructuralist and critical semiotic approach, Barthes defines myth as a “type of speech defined by its intention”.⁴⁶ For Barthes, everything can be a myth as long as it has a mythical intention, and this intention is ideological *naturalization*. In Barthes’ theory, a myth is composed of two semantic systems: a connoted level of ideological meaning coupled with a denoted level of literal meaning, whose function is to *naturalize* the connoted meaning in concrete denoted elements. This combination of denoted and connoted meanings makes myth a “depoliticized speech” through an emptying process : “The function of myth is to empty reality. [...] In passing from history to nature, myth acts economically: it abolishes the complexity of human acts, it

gives them the simplicity of essences, [...] things appear to mean something by themselves.”⁴⁷ The denoted, political signifier is impoverished and becomes a form for a connoted, essentialized ideological meaning, but does not disappear for all that. Barthes’ famous example of the French black soldier who salutes the French flag illustrates how myth is built on this junction between denotation and connotation. If the readers perceive the black soldier as a symbol, i.e. as an empty signifier, his denoted and concrete existence totally disappears in the message; he becomes an empty token at the service of the abstract idea of French imperialism. By contrast, if the readers interpret the soldier as a full signifier, taking his actual existence into full consideration, they will understand how he is used as an example or an “alibi for French imperialism”.⁴⁸ Lastly, if they are sensitive to the interwoven denoted and connoted semantic systems of the myth, they are confronted with its in-between signification: the black soldier is not a symbol or an example but an essentialized, yet real, “*presence of French imperialism*” (idem). The power of the myth is based on such authentic elements, as they lend it an illusion of denoted credibility,⁴⁹ which the symbol does not, while they at the same time naturalize and essentialize these denoted elements. In sum, the myth is “a story at once true and unreal,”⁵⁰ the power of which is based on the fact that it does not lie or hide any meaning, but distorts it in a naturalization process. Its power also lies in its collective dimension; the authorship of myths is attributed to societies and not to individuals.⁵¹ Built on “the moulding force of the society,”⁵² collective authorship reinforces the naturalization of a culture. This is key to appreciate the finer details of jihadi-Salafist propaganda. Jihadi culture is a culture that is to be built up. Having renounced their nationality, jihadists invent a *new* identity and create a “culture of romance” based on adventure and medieval heroism, through narrating the fantasy life of Jihad.⁵³ This culture of romance can sometimes be coupled with a culture of

rebellion that borrows myths from other cultures, for example Che Guevara by foreign fighters.⁵⁴

In sum, myth is a process that goes from the particular to the general. In our view, eudaimonic content is precisely based on an inverse relation between the particular and the general, which can also be very powerful.

The persuasive power of eudaimonic content

Eudaimonic entertainment provides inspirational content that favors feelings of well-being and self-transcendence.⁵⁵ They turn one's attention inward to an increased interconnectedness with others and higher causes, so that one recognizes elements of shared humanity in oneself that lead to feelings of elevation, gratitude, awe, admiration, as well as appreciation of beauty, excellence, hope and spirituality.⁵⁶

Eudaimonic content can take the form of quotes or "preconstructs".⁵⁷ These are collective prediscursive frameworks that play a role in the transmission and circulation of meaning in social groups, like popular wisdom or proverbs. Eudaimonic content is inspiring, and inspiring content is more likely to be shared, which, in turn motivates inspired users to spread it in order to inspire others.⁵⁸ In propaganda contexts, this softened power of circulation of ideas is particularly worrisome.

Preconstructs typically come across as natural and taken for granted due to their monoglossic formulations in bare statements that do not refer to, or recognize, alternative points of view.⁵⁹ In the same vein, quotes are often decontextualized and become essences. In our view, the force of eudaimonic contents lies in the possibility of transforming essences into empty shells that are ready for hosting connoted meanings according to the contexts in which they are used. And this also holds for jihadi-Salafist

propaganda. Eudaimonic content was prevalent in Frischlich's corpus of Instagram posts written by a Salafist influencer,⁶⁰ as is illustrated in the depictions of the beauty and vastness of nature, moral principles regarding appropriate religious or societal behaviour, and idealizations of an infinite afterlife. For Frischlich, the prevalence of eudaimonic content confirms that "terrorists inspire their followers; they don't merely persuade them,"⁶¹ much like myth.

We argue that when used for ideological purposes, eudaimonic content is composed of two semantic systems: presupposed, depoliticized essences (meaning 1) become tokens for connoted ideology (meaning 2). This politicizing process goes from the general to the particular through the addition of connoted ideological meaning. It contrasts with the myth as a depoliticized speech in Barthes' theory, which goes from the particular to the general through impoverishment. When myth "transforms history into nature,"⁶² eudaimonic content in an ideological context transforms nature into history. In both cases, "things appear to mean something by themselves".⁶³

Motivated by this review of the literature, we sought to investigate the following research questions:

RQ1: To what extent do these Facebook posts written by extremist Salafists comprise ingroup-outgroup opposition? The answer to RQ1 will allow us to determine whether ingroup vs. outgroup narratives are prevalent or not among the totality of the posts. The other research questions only concern posts containing ingroup-outgroup opposition; insofar as this ingroup-outgroup division is a necessary condition of extremist content (see definitions of extremism in the following Section).

RQ2: To what extent do these posts include URLs that link to news media? To what extent are these media artefacts related to the crisis construct?

RQ3: To what extent are these ingroup-outgroup posts based on crisis, identity and/or solution frames?

RQ4: To what extent are these ingroup-outgroup posts extremist ones, which breach Facebook's community standards? What are the characteristics of these posts?

RQ5: How do these extremist Salafists use myth or eudaimonic content to convey jihadi-Salafist ideology while circumventing Facebook's community standards?

Materials and Method

Collection of data

Identifying IS supporters' social media accounts is harder than official accounts, for obvious reasons of social visibility.⁶⁴ This is even more true for profiles that do not, at least publicly, express their adhesion to any extremist organization. Such actors communicate radicalized content in the middle of regular, non-extremist posts, following a "wolf-in-sheep's-clothes-strategy"⁶⁵. In order to create the corpus, we manually identified ten accounts through leads that came from two main sources, namely experts' reports and direct consultancy of experts. Ten other accounts were further identified through chain-referral sampling, a technique also used in other research on close corpora.⁶⁶ Given the absence of refined techniques to automatically analyze visual content, we sought to limit our corpus to a feasible but exhaustive number of posts. As such, we selected seven accounts out of the twenty identified, based on the volume of their publications. We chose the accounts that published the most. In total, our corpus of text-image posts written by seven accounts reach 1720

posts.

For ethical and GDPR-related reasons, all these profiles are public. Their use of French syntax leads us to assume that they are male Facebook users but we cannot have any certainty about these profiles' gender. We did not record the user handles to maintain confidentiality and we re-labelled them using arbitrary identifiers (e.g. FB1). The time period covered in our analysis depends on the date of creation of the profile. Within these timeframes, all the multimodal posts written by these accounts which were still present on Facebook in October 2019 were collected. Our corpus only consists of posts written in French. With rare exceptions, some terms were written in Arabic.

INSERT TABLE 1 here (created in Word, see end of the paper)

Table 1. Our corpus of seven Facebook profiles

Analysis of the URLs

Two independent coders first coded the types of the URLs comprised in the posts, according to the following categories of websites: news media, Muslim-related news media, fundraising, NGOs, social media platforms, file-sharing websites, Muslim online bookshops, broken URL, and 'other' ($k = 1$).

Manual quantitative and qualitative content analysis

The two independent coders have native or near-native language levels in French; one coder has a good command of Arabic and translated the few words in Arabic. They first tested the first version of the codebook (drawing from the literature presented above) on a sample of the corpus. Subsequently, we discussed the categories and refined the

codebook. Next, both coders coded another sample of 100 posts independently in order to assure a univocal understanding of the classification system. After a discussion and final revision of the codebook, both coders coded the rest of the corpus independently. Subsequently, posts over which there was disagreement were discussed. The high Cohen's kappas below indicate the stable character of the categories:

INSERT TABLE 2 here (created in Word, see end of the paper)

Table 2. Our coding categories and their related Cohen's kappas

The coding unit consists of each post, which comprises visual content and possibly accompanying texts and hashtags.

At the first level of the analysis, we sought to identify the posts containing ingroup-outgroup opposition. Content comprising such opposition is likely to be polarized but not systematically extremist. For example, many posts criticize the coalition in Syria without extremist arguments. Berger defines extremism as “a spectrum of beliefs in which an in-group's success is inseparable from negative acts against an outgroup. Negative acts can include verbal attacks and diminishment, discriminatory behaviour, or violence. [...] The need for harmful activity must be inseparable from the in-group's understanding of success in order to qualify. Similarly, not every harmful act is necessarily extremist”⁶⁷ Simply put, extremism is framed as an ingroup vs. outgroup division that entails intrinsic hostility. This hostility is removed from Facebook based on its community standards related to hate speech and violence incitement.⁶⁸ Some definitions do not distinguish between extremism and violent extremism, insofar as violence is always accepted as a legitimate means by extremists.⁶⁹ Viewed from this angle, “non-violent extremism does not exist.”⁷⁰ However, Berger

insists on the ideological nature of violence in violent extremism. This requires drawing a distinction between extremism and violent extremism. He defines violent extremism as “the belief that an ingroup’s success is inseparable from violence against an outgroup. [...] Again, inseparability is the key element here, reflecting that the need for violence against the outgroup is not conditional or situational.”⁷¹ In Berger’s definitions, violence as an optional means of victory against the outgroup falls within extremism; violence as an ideological choice to win over the outgroup falls within violent extremism. Berger illustrates this difference by contrasting a war with a genocidal war: in the first case, violence is, among others, a means for victory; in the second case, violence is part of the genocidal ideology. In the case of Global Jihadist Movements, violence can be considered as violent extremism, given that this ideology considers that victory implies the destruction of the enemy; cohabitation between winners and losers is ideologically impossible. Violence is not only accepted, as in Schmid’s definition, it is an ideological *sine qua non*. This ideological distinction does not affect Facebook’s community standards, though: whether it is guided by extremism or violent extremism, hate speech and violence incitement violate them in any case.

After identifying the posts with ingroup-outgroup opposition, we sought to identify to what extent these profiles use crisis, identity and solution constructs to express extremist content. To do so, we conducted a quantitative content analysis of the posts according to six frames (see Table 2). These frames are derived from Ingram’s crisis-identity-solution constructs⁷²; the categories under these three divisions are based on the existing literature presented above. They are not mutually exclusive. The crisis category ‘dilution or breakdown of traditions’ concerns declines in core Islamic principles. References to the negative consequences for deviant Muslims, but also calls

to boycott elections, fall within this category, given that democracy goes against Islamic principles. ‘Attacks against the ummah (i.e. Muslim community)’ can consist of military, political or societal ones (e.g. military operations or discrimination practices by Western institutions or individuals). Posts which frame Muslim prisoners as victims also fall within this category. In the identity construct, ‘inspiring extremist figures’ can be members of extremist organizations, extremist scholars, or extremist Muslims who are framed positively. In the solution construct, praising IS’ caliphate or the caliphate *in abstracto* falls within the ‘caliphate as Islamic utopia’ category. Lastly, posts in which violence is presented as an explicit solution against outgroups fall within the last category. Implicit violence is not manifest content that can be quantitatively coded; we address it in the qualitative analysis of the quantitative results. The quantitative results are presented for each profile. To analyze the significance of the differences in frequency between the profiles, we did not use Chi-square tests, given that many of the figures reached below five, which invalidates these calculations.

Lastly, bearing this quantitative understanding of our corpus in mind, we performed a qualitative analysis of the posts with ingroup-outgroup opposition to identify the communication patterns that the profiles use to share extremist propaganda. In particular, we analyzed how these profiles use myths and eudaimonic content in their Facebook posts to promote jihad and circumvent the social platform’s community standards.

Results

Ingroup-outgroup opposition (RQ1)

173 posts out of 1720 contained ingroup-outgroup opposition (see Table 1). Individual frequencies range from 7% to 24%. The other posts are religious principles without any implicit or explicit reference to any outgroup, for example. It is striking to notice that these profiles are not fuelled by ingroup-outgroup opposition as a key frame. While only one profile covers anti-outgroup feelings in nearly one out of four posts, all the other profiles fall below 15%. In most profiles, it appears as a topic among many, and even less covered than others. The insights related to RQ3, RQ4 and RQ5 only concern the identified 173 posts which contain ingroup-outgroup opposition because such division is considered a necessary condition for extremist propaganda (see Method).

URLs towards news media artefacts (RQ2)

The analysis of the URLs revealed that the 1720 posts comprise 130 URLs in total. 66 of them (i.e. the half) link to fundraising websites (see Table 3 below).

INSERT TABLE 3 here (created in Word, see end of the paper)

Table 3. Types of URLs in our corpus of 1720 Facebook posts

Only two URLs link to news media (i.e. lemonde.fr and v.aa.com.tr); one URL links to a Muslim-related information website (www.saphirnews.com). 14 URLs link towards social media content. 23 of these 130 URLs are included in posts with ingroup-outgroup opposition. Only the link to the news article by *Le Monde* is used in a crisis construct. Interestingly, the posts containing extremist content (see below) never contain URLs.

Crisis, identity and solution constructs (RQ3 and RQ4)

Our quantitative findings are presented in the table below.

INSERT TABLE 4 here (created in Word, see end of the paper)

Table 4. Crisis, identity and solutions constructs, in absolute numbers and in percentage points, per profile

The dilution of true Islam and/or the breakdown of religious traditions

The dilution of true Islam and/or the breakdown of traditions is a key topic in some profiles, observed in at least 50% of three profiles' posts (i.e. 50%, 56% and 64%). We did not find any breach or play with Facebook's community standards through these frames.

Attacks against the ummah

Attacks against the ummah are a key topic, covered in 50 up to 100% of the posts of four profiles (i.e. 53%, 67%, 71%, 100%). These attacks mostly concern the Syrian conflict as well as the persecution of the Rohingya minorities. Eleven posts frame terrorism-related Muslim prisoners as victims of the West. They refer to five prisoners, which are related to various situations of conflict : 1) Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani female operative of Al Qaeda according to the FBI, convicted of attempted murder and assault of US personnel; 2) the Palestinian prisoner Bassam El Sayeh, responsible for the death of a rabbi and his wife in 2015; 3) Abdel Wahab Al Rahabi, who was kept and then released from Guantanamo and whose detention was justified by the FBI by the fact that he was captured among Bin Laden's bodyguards; 4) Omar Abdel Rahman, leader of an

Egyptian militant group recognized as a terrorist organization by the USA and Egypt; and 5) Moussa El Qarni, Bin Laden's advisor in Islamic law. According to its community standards, Facebook removes "content that expresses support for groups, leaders or individuals involved in these [violent] activities", or symbols that represent them if they are used "without context that condemns or neutrally discusses the content."⁷³ The posts about these prisoners perfectly illustrate how it is possible to circumvent these community standards. We did not observe content that explicitly expresses support, but we did identify four strategies that allow them to circumvent these bans. These techniques are often interwoven in posts. Firstly, these posts never mention these prisoners' actions or the reason justifying their detentions; they rather divert the focus to their prison conditions that they denounce, with mentions of torture, medical negligence or very concrete situations that easily create shocking visual representations in the reader's mind (e.g. Muslim prisoners forced to eat pork and drink toilet water).

A second strategy to implicitly support prisoners is to positively frame their personality with characteristics that are not related to their terrorist actions. One post insists on El Qarni's intellectual value (i.e. "a lecturer in several Saudi and international universities"); Siddiqui is referred to as "a brilliant neuroscientist; very active in the da'wa and in humanitarian work". Such positive framing is not ideologically-loaded; opponents to Siddiqui would also acknowledge that she is a brilliant scientist. By contrast, more general stances sometimes present the prisoner as a model, for unspecified reasons, which may, therefore, include terrorism-related ones. For example, Siddiqui is referred to as "our noble sister" in one post. This subtly breaches Facebook's community standards, in our view, in so far as its non-specificity is synonymous with general praise and does not condemn Siddiqui's actions.

A third strategy of implicit support is based on indirect references. One post starts with the death of the innocent 16-year-old son of Al Qaeda member Anwar Al Awlaki. This highly prolific American-Yemeni AQ member was a charismatic preacher killed by an American drone in 2011; his son was killed two weeks later by the US army, too.¹ Here, the post subtly mixes the general topic of children's death and ideological propaganda. The rest of the post reinforces the ideological focus on terrorists by continuing to denounce the torturing of Aafia Siddiqui.

Lastly, the fourth strategy consists in the support of unspecified prisoners, presented as examples to follow and to support: "Our prisoners of liberty will continue their remarkable resistance. They continue to teach a lesson of courage and determination. [...] In the meantime, behind the Palestinian prisoners, all our people will continue the struggle, until the conquest of their legitimate rights and until the last prisoner is released from Israeli prisons and ghettos." In this post, we also observed a vague rhetoric of resistance and unspecified "struggle." In such posts, the prisoners are not only victims and triggers for ingroup grievances (crisis construct), they are also explicit inspiring figures to admire (identity construct), and the non-specificity makes it possible to circumvent the bans.

Apart from these techniques that are used in posts related to prisoners, many posts implicitly justify violence by framing it as defensive, in reaction to the outgroup's attacks. Several posts consist of pseudo-factual explanations of the emergence of terrorist groups (e.g., the thousands of deaths in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan or Central Africa, the tortures in American secret prisons, etc.); one post frames Western

¹ In 2017, Youtube decided to remove Awlaki's entire body of work from the video platform. It was the first time Youtube took such concerted action against a particular individual.

interventions as the terrorist ones to fight against (“The war against terrorism is Guantanamo and its rapes of prisoners yet untried, rapes of women in Fallujah. [...]”). Furthermore, calls for divine violence are sometimes used to advocate defensive violence, e.g., “May Allah hasten his punishment to all those tyrants who humiliate, torture, imprison and oppress Muslims on earth”. Advocating hypothetical future violence is a close strategy, e.g., “The Day will come when they will shed tears in torrents as punishment for their deeds.” Such advocating of defensive, divine or future violence does not violate Facebook’s community standards because it remains figurative and vague.

Finally, we observed a rather strong focus on either the political or the religious crisis construct: the profiles that put emphasis on the attacks against the ummah (FB1, FB2, FB6, FB7) contrast with those that tend to focus on the dilution of Islam and the breakdown of the traditions (FB3, FB5). Only FB4 does not focus on any of the two.

Inspiring extremist figures

No post praises terrorist organizations. Twenty-five posts refer to extremist figures as models, in six profiles. We managed to distinguish three types: 1) controversial Muslims, 2) scholars and 3) members of terrorist organizations. Yvonne Ridley falls within the first category (controversial Muslims). She is a British journalist who was captured and released by the Taliban and converted to Islam. In one post, she is quoted as an example when she calls the Muslims to wake up. While she is not a member of any terrorist organisation, she sometimes appears as a terror apologist, particularly when she relativizes the notion of terrorism when asked who the terrorists are: “As a journalist, I would love to scrap the word terrorist, it is meaningless. Nelson Mandela [...] was called a terrorist by Margaret Thatcher.” (Ridley, n.d.). In the second category

(scholars), five extremist scholars are referred to, in six profiles: Abd Al Wahhâb, Muhammad Al-Amin Ach-Chanquiti, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Sayyid Qutb and Ibn Taymiyya. References to these scholars mostly take the form of essentialized quotes devoid of any personal comment by the post's author. Ingroup vs. outgroup opposition is presented in a timeless way in sacred texts. In only one political post, Qutb is quoted and warns against becoming like the spiritually empty American society, by abandoning Islam. The posts falling within these first two categories (controversial Muslims and scholars) may fuel, but do not call for, violence against the outgroups and therefore cannot be considered as violating Facebook's community standards. These people's presence as such is not forbidden on the social platform. For the third category (members of terrorist groups), we found eleven instances of members of terrorist groups in six profiles. They are mere members or top leaders: the prisoners mentioned above, as well as 1) the Al Qaeda member Anwar Al Awlaki, 2) Bajad Al Outaybi, leader of the Ikhwan movement in Saudi Arabia (Muslim Brotherhood), 3) Osama Bin Laden, 4) Adil Charkaoui, who was convicted and then released by the Canadian authorities for his alleged connections with jihadi movements, 5) the Belgian leader and recruiter of foreign terrorist fighters Jean-Louis Denis, and 6) the charismatic jihadi Emir Khattab, who fought during the Chechen wars and who was a pioneer of jihadi media. Similar to the posts focusing on prisoners, these posts always strategically avoid praising these people's actions. Furthermore, nearly all the references are quotes without personal comments, which also circumvent explicit endorsement. These terrorists are mostly referred to through quotes, which either express ingroup-outgroup opposition (close to those expressed by scholars, see above) or comment on geopolitical conflicts. The first type fuels ingroup-outgroup opposition but does not advocate anti-outgroup actions, not even implicitly. Adil Charkaoui's quote, in which he comments on the dramatic

situation in Syria, exemplifies the second type. With recourse to an emotionally charged lexicon (e.g., “a picture that hurts more than all the bombings on earth”), Charkaoui condemns Bashar El Assad’s terrorism, the lack of intervention by international powers, and the indifference by part of the ummah. These quotes do not breach Facebook’s community standards either, in contrast to a post referring to Bin Laden. In this long post (over 500 words), based on extracts of interviews released by Wikileaks, Bin Laden explains his links with the United States during his jihad in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. One sentence explicitly praises violent extremism: “All Muslims hate Americans, Jews and Christians. It is part of our beliefs and our religion. Ever since I was a boy I have been at war with the Americans and I have fed it with hatred.”

Whereas these leaks might be considered as factual elements that can be discussed neutrally, the author of the post frames them positively and violates, quite subtly, Facebook’s community standards, when he expresses his satisfaction that this leaked interview will displease “hypocrites and islamophobes.” In addition, the visual content plays an implicit role: Bin Laden’s picture as a smiling man in the prime of his life puts him in a positive light. Thirdly, as we will see in the specific section about myths below, quotes by Al Awlaki and Khattab are used to construct jihadi myths.

Only the references to Jean-Louis Denis are not based on quotes but on positive framing of his personality, a technique we also observed in references to prisoners (see above). He is described with mentions of his “self-sacrifice for a transcendental cause”, his “steadfastness”, and his “determination, resolute in all circumstances”. One of the pictures is a slightly low angle shot, eyes to the sky and smile, which also tends to frame him positively.

Caliphate as Islamic utopia

Not a single post of our corpus praises the caliphate. However, it is implicitly praised in two posts which lament the negative evolution of a young Muslim who used to be “pro-caliphate, pro-sharia”. He recently received the Legion of Honour by French politicians.

Violence as an explicit solution

“Only” four posts were considered to be explicitly advocating violence as a solution against outgroups. They are divided into two types. The first type is composed of extracts from religious texts that advocate violent jihad. This type was found in three posts. The first post is a long text (889 words) which consists of Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s list of the 26 believers’ characteristics (9th century). Number 16 is that “He believes that Jihad continues from the time Allah sent Muhammad to the last group that will fight the dajall [evil character, liar and deceiver]. They will not suffer any harm from the misdeeds and wrongdoers.” Another post refers to a sura stating that “disbelief is worse than murder”. The sura is coupled with a picture of a hand holding a ballot paper, both covered in blood. The third post refers to an extract of Ad-Dourar As-Saniyyah, a collection of books about the Sunna:

Hatred towards these polytheists, their criticism, takfir, disavowal, is the foundation of Islam and the greatest means of access to the Lord of the Worlds. Moreover, the life of a Muslim will have no pleasure except with the jihad against them, against their opposition and their takfir, and with approaching Allah with that, hoping for His reward.

Jihad is never framed positively through frames of adventure or camaraderie, but only evoked via these texts.

The second type of posts is constructed on purely visual strategies and was found in only one post: one post is composed of portraits of four contemporary Muslim thinkers who are considered as deviant and “enemies” by the post’s author. Their portraits are presented inside red gunsights.

These four posts breach Facebook’s community standards, either through text or visual content. Yet, many other posts rather circumvent them, especially through naturalization strategies based on myth or eudaimonic content.

Myth and eudaimonic content to naturalize jihadi-Salafist propaganda (RQ5)

Several posts referring to inspiring figures or implicitly advocating jihad particularly reveal how these private profiles naturalize jihadi-Salafist propaganda through myth or eudaimonic content. In this Section, we examine five posts that exemplify the strategies of naturalization through myth and eudaimonic content that we observed in the corpus. In the first two posts, each containing a reference to a jihadi fighter, myth making is illustrated in two different ways. In the post below, Khattab is referred to in a quote that calls for insurrection: “Arab leaders are slaves to the West. [...] The time has come to free ourselves from these slaves.”



Image 1. Reference to Emir Khattab in myth

This quote consists of vague and decontextualized rhetoric of liberation, which leaves the door wide open for interpretations: violence might be the most logical means given that it was written by a jihadi who was not famous for his pacific mindset, but it remains one interpretation among others, since liberation *in abstracto* can also be performed through non-violent means. Again, quotes without any comment smooth the path towards implicit endorsement, which circumvents Facebook's community services. But there is more than a doublespeak strategy: two processes increase the *naturalization* of this content. Firstly, the linguistic construction of this quote makes it a monoglossic assertion that does not refer to, or recognize, alternative points of view and which, therefore, appears as presuppositional and taken-for-granted ⁷⁴. Secondly and more interestingly, Khattab's portrait consists of interwoven denoted and connoted meanings, which can make it appear much like a myth. His portrait is stylized: the smoothed features decontextualize it by erasing any trace of time passing, and the visual codes create analogies with Che Guevara's portrait. Like the black soldier in Barthes' theory, Khattab is not merely a symbol or an example, but becomes a myth, i.e. an essentialized yet real *presence* of jihadi ideology, a naturalized "story at once true and unreal."⁷⁵

The second mythical post is composed of Al Awlaki's quote: "There are people who had to face the hardships and who were as firm as mountains, even though they had little science, and others who memorized books but who failed in the hardships." This quote is coupled with the picture of an armed combatant kneeling near his horse grazing in a vast meadow, with two riders galloping in the background, one waving a black flag with unidentifiable white lettering (highly likely the Shahada, see Image 2). Whereas the vagueness of this quote makes it suitable for a multitude of contexts, the visual

elements as well as the quote's author render the context implicitly connected to the globally active Jihadist movements.

Il y a des gens qui ont dû faire face aux épreuves et qui étaient fermes comme des montagnes, et cela même si ils avaient peu de science, et d'autres qui ont mémorisé des livres, mais qui ont échoué lors des épreuves.

{ Shaykh Anwâr Al'Awlaki رحمه الله }



Image 2. Reference to Anwâr Al Awlaki in myth

This picture may be interpreted as a symbolic one, in which the three characters become empty signifiers, without denoted and concrete existence, who symbolize fight and bravery. However, a mythical interpretation is also possible, and much more powerful, if the reader perceives that this picture interweaves denoted and connoted meanings. The failed picture frame of the left horse rider, of whom we can only see half the body, gives the impression that this photo was taken on the spot and is, as such, an “act of non-intervention”⁷⁶ and thereby visually *denoted* evidence. In this case, these three characters do not only symbolize fight and bravery; they rather *embody* these values with their essentialized, yet real presence. In combination with Al Awlaki's monoglossic quote, this picture *naturalizes* the jihadi-Salafist ideology of the brave fighter and frames it as a myth.

Furthermore, Jihadi-Salafists do not only create their own myths like these two ones; they also pick up myths from other cultural backgrounds, like Che Guevara.⁷⁷ In our corpus, apart from posts containing a reference to jihadi fighters like the two posts above, they pay tribute to Omar Al Mokhtar. This mythical figure of the rebellion against the Italian dictatorship in Libya bears no relation to the jihadi ideology but is often used as a symbolic resistance fighter by Jihadi's. One post emphasizes Al Mokhtar's qualities as a man and his aplomb in the face of his enemies, without mentioning any concrete aspects of his fight (not even the country). Again, these denoted but essentialized elements makes this myth particularly powerful. In these three cases, these myths are depoliticized speeches which impoverish – but do not erase - denoted elements in favor of an essentialized and naturalized connoted meaning, from the particular to the general. Let us now ascertain how eudaimonic content works as an inverted mechanism, from the general to the particular. Eudaimonic content is also based on monoglossic assertions or decontextualized quotes, coupled with pictures. Contrary to the visual elements in the myth, these pictures are symbolic, i.e. empty signifiers. They often represent lions, a key symbol of power and strength in Muslim culture. In the post below, a lion is coupled with Henri Laborit's decontextualized quote “when faced with a hardship, a man has three choices. Do nothing, run away or fight!”



Image 3. Reference to Laborit in eudaimonic content

This post exemplifies how eudaimonic content used for ideological propaganda is built on two semantic systems. Decontextualized quotes or universal statements are depoliticized essences (system 1) that become tokens for a connoted ideology by adding visual elements or comments (system 2). This process of naturalisation of essences remains connoted and implicit: even if we can assume that the author of this post uses coded meaning related to the need to fight with violence, given the general tone of his posts, he does not issue such calls for actions explicitly. Doublespeak and polysemy allow literal and figurative interpretations of this content.

We observed a similar process of naturalization through eudaimonic content in the post below, which is built on monoglossic statements and connoted visual content. The image shows a group of lions walking in the direction of the viewer; the embedded eudaimonic text calls to “surround yourself with those who have the same mission as you”; the comment below the visual content indicates “in fact, as long as you fear Allah,

they fear you... So you become a nightmare if you fear nothing but Allah.” All these sentences are monoglossic, taken for granted, and presuppositional.



Image 4. Vague reference to an implicitly violent mission in eudaimonic content

These sentences are particularly evocative while remaining implicit. The combination of the different elements of the post might be interpreted as an invitation to gather for the sake of violent extremism, but again, there are no explicit markers that allow to validate this interpretation. Here again, the author implicitly applies natural essences (eudaimonic reference to a mission) and presuppositional statements to the jihadi-Salafist ideology in a strategy of doublespeak and ideological naturalization: like myths, such eudaimonic posts seem to be self-evident.

Discussion and conclusion

Regarding RQ1, this frame analysis revealed that the studied profiles do not fall within Bindner and Gluck's type of dormant cells who feed short-lived accounts that are created when specific elements of propaganda emerge (2019). All the profiles were

active for at least several months and most of their posts do not contain ingroup-outgroup opposition (i.e. between 76% and 93%). The salience of the two frames which fuel extremism the most (i.e. inspiring extremist figures and violence as solution) is also very low: the frequency of these occurrences in each profile's total corpus never exceeds 1% of content. This confirms how these profiles follow a "wolf-in-sheep's-clothes-strategy".⁷⁸ Their prevalent non-violent public content might be a cover-up for their propaganda strategies via private messages. Of course, this hypothesis cannot be confirmed nor refuted by our analysis of public posts. Our insights related to RQ2 revealed that URLs are not frequently included in the 1720 Facebook posts (130 in total). Unlike IS supporters on Twitter,⁷⁹ these GJM supporters do not instrumentalize news media artefacts to strengthen the Salafist crisis, identity and solution constructs.

Regarding RQ3 and RQ4, while IS' official and professionalized communication contrasts with the amateur and user-generated posts in our corpus, they both particularly build on the crisis-identity-solution construct.⁸⁰ Victimhood is a key frame in official and unofficial propaganda. Denunciation strategies are particularly image-based, like in official propaganda: several images of lethal victims were observed, as well as numerous pictures of injured citizens, particularly children.⁸¹ Unlike denunciations of attacks against the ummah which do not violate Facebook's community standards, the posts focusing on Muslim prisoners' arrest and prison conditions frame them as victims⁸² and mostly implicitly praise violent extremism through decontextualization or positive framing. The identity construct also fuels extremism, when extremist figures are framed as being inspiring. Here again, this support for violent extremism is mostly implicit, through decontextualized quotes, limited endorsement or positive framing of the figure. Lastly, the solution construct frames violence as an explicit solution against the outgroup in five posts in our corpus.

Many others manage to sidestep Facebook's community standards, by framing violence as defensive, in advocating future or divine violence, or by using doublespeak strategies (mostly vague fight rhetoric). In the most explicit posts of our corpus, the devil is in the details: one or two explicit sentences are present in the middle of long texts, which are sometimes difficult to read due to their poor linguistic quality. Therefore, they often need to be read very carefully in order to be understood and to identify the problematic parts; otherwise they could easily go undetected. This process takes time, and it is reasonable to question whether moderators have the necessary time to locate such content and draw the line between what is acceptable and what is not taking account of the context, since moderators only have a few seconds to make decisions.⁸³ This particularly points out the tension between broad policies that leave the door open to the contextualized enforcement of internal rules on the one hand, and working conditions that promote replicable decisions which do not leave much room for context, on the other hand.

Regarding RQ5, the lion imagery is frequently used in eudaimonic strategies. Frischlich⁸⁴ ranked eudaimonic content as the most prevalent type of content in an extremist influencer's Instagram posts. In line with Frischlich, we observed that conservative principles are not best suited for eudaimonic entertainment: posts about the negative consequences for deviant Muslims are rather based on fearful arguments, which is incompatible with the general feeling of positivity at the core of eudaimonic communication. Likewise, in our corpus, most crisis posts that polarize ingroup vs. outgroups focus on negativity. For this reason, eudaimonic posts are rather rare in our corpus, unlike in Frischlich's corpus. Frischlich's corpus and our dataset also share some similarities. As in Frischlich's analysis, eudaimonic strategies were sometimes used to implicitly praise violence (see Images 3 and 4). Vague rhetorics of the fight are

adapted for eudaimonic strategies. However, we question how “depictions of human drama as violence justification,”⁸⁵ which are based on negative crisis-related arguments, can be considered as eudaimonic posts, as Frischlich suggests. In this light, we opted for a more restricted approach to eudaimonic content, in the sense that it cannot be exclusively crisis-related and must embrace some level of positivity and empowerment. Both based on two systems of meaning, eudaimonic contents and myths⁸⁶ are powerful strategies of ideological naturalization that play with the general and the particular in order to express ideas that seem to be self-evident. The essentialized yet real presence of jihadi ideology we observed in several mythical posts make such content “at once true and unreal,”⁸⁷ and hence particularly powerful. Furthermore, the anonymous authorship of user-generated content on social media is likely to reinforce the collective authorship of these myths, built on “the moulding force of the society.”⁸⁸

Three limitations to our work need to be taken into account. Firstly, we confined ourselves to the analysis of posts with visual content; we did not analyze video or text-only messages, as our research question focuses on text-image relationships. Secondly, our dataset consists of 1,720 posts from seven Facebook profiles. Given the relatively limited number of studied profiles, the quantitative findings cannot be generalized beyond this corpus. That said, the implicit and explicit extremist communication patterns we qualitatively analyzed will allow for insights into the roles that text and visual content play in other corpora of extremist propaganda. Thirdly, like all researchers working with social media data, we do not know whether we have analyzed a truly exhaustive corpus, or whether it has undergone prior removal by Facebook. When we contacted the social platform with general questions about their policies and moderation practices in order to better understand our corpus without violating any of these profiles’ GDPR-related protections, we were kindly invited to read the community

standards - again. We understand Facebook’s concern when they argue that “we are careful not to reveal too much about our enforcement techniques because of adversarial shifts by terrorists.”⁸⁹ We regret that this choice in favor of discretion also applies to researchers. Of course, moderation is not an easy task. Yet, with its 2.7 billion users in the second quarter of 2020, Facebook plays an increasingly significant role as cultural intermediary, establishing the content and character of public discourse.⁹⁰ This is a sufficiently democratic reason to demand greater transparency from Facebook about the ways in which content is assessed or moderators make their decisions to remove content or not.⁹¹

Facebook updates its policies constantly. We can only call for more collaboration with academia in this process. With content reviewers in the firing line, policy makers and researchers need detailed typologies of extremist communication strategies in order to identify and counter them specifically. This also explains why we provided detailed descriptions of the Facebook posts under study. In this context, our finely grained insights will help actors involved in countering extremism to identify extremist practices on social media in various types of Jihad supporters’ profiles.

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Tables created in Word

Table 1

Initials	Type of profile	Number of posts	Number of posts with ingroup-outgroup opposition	Time period covered
FB1	Personal profile	62	15 (24%)	2019
FB2	Personal profile	126	17 (13%)	2016-2019
FB3	Personal profile	737	74 (10%)	2019
FB4	Personal profile	85	13 (15%)	2019
FB5	Page	138	12 (9%)	2017-2018
FB6	Personal profile	501	33 (7%)	2017-2019
FB7	Personal profile	71	9 (13%)	2016-2019
Total		1720	173	

Table 1: Our corpus of Salafist extremist Facebook profiles

Table 2

Ingroup-outgroup opposition	0.762	N = 1720
Dilution of true Islam and/or breakdown of tradition	0.713	N = 173
Attacks against the ummah	0.856	N = 173
Inspiring extremist figures	1	N = 173
Caliphate as Islamic utopia	1	N = 173
Violence as an explicit solution	1	N = 173

Table 2: Our categories and their related Cohen's kappas

Table 3

Types of URLs	Number
Fundraising	66
NGOs	16
Social media platforms	14 (Telegram: 6; Youtube: 4; Whatsapp: 2; Facebook: 1; Twitter: 1)
File-sharing websites	13
Muslim bookshops	11
News media	2
Muslim-related news media	1
Other	6 (archives.org: 1; amazon.fr: 1; adilcharkaoui.com: 2; file.wikileaks.org: 2)
Broken link	1
Total	130

Table 3: Types of URLs in our corpus of 1720 Facebook posts

Table 4

Crisis-identity-solutions constructs (%)	FB1	FB2	FB3	FB4	FB5	FB6	FB7
Dilution and/or breakdown	1 7%	0 0%	47 64%	2 15%	6 50%	9 26%	5 56%
Attacks against the ummah	8 53%	17 100%	13 18%	1 8%	4 33%	24 71%	6 67%

Inspiring extremist figures	2 13%	0 0%	10 14%	2 15%	2 17%	6 18%	3 33%
Caliphate as Islamic utopia	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%
Violence as an explicit solution	1 7%	0 0%	1 1%	0 0%	0 0%	0 0%	2 22%

Table 4: Crisis, identity and solutions constructs, in absolute numbers and in percentage points, per profile